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Abstract
We apply well-known results of the econometric learning literature to a standard RBC model
with unemployment. The unique REE is always expectationally stable with decreasing gain learn-
ing, and this result is robust to over-parametrisation of the econometric model relative to the min-
imum state variable form used by agents (Strong E-stability). And so, from this perspective, the
assumption of rational expectations in the Mortensen-Pissarides is not unreasonable. Using a para-
metrisation with UK data, simulations suggest that the implied rate of convergence to the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) with least squares learning is however slow. The cyclical response
of unemployment to structural shocks is muted under learning, and a parametrisation which guaran-
tees root-t convergence is generally not consistent with attempts to match the observed volatility of
labour market data using the standard model.
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1 Introduction
The Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) model of search frictions has become the foundation for the invest-
igation of the functioning of labour markets (see Rogerson & Shimer, 2011 for a survey). The existence
of search frictions in labour markets is usually motivated by the observation that the market is decent-
ralised due to geographical and sectoral differences in firms, and the fact that each worker has distinct
features which make them more or less suitable for these jobs. That is, there is fundamental heterogen-
eity present in labour markets. Whilst searching for a match, unemployed workers and firms have to
form expectations regarding future variables, which are relevant for their decision making process, such
as the unemployment rate and the quantity of open vacancies. The decentralised nature of labour mar-
kets makes it a priori not obvious that workers and firms are able to correctly quantify the values of these
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relevant variables at all times. Nevertheless, the assumption that firms and unemployed workers have
rational expectations is usually made in search and matching models, which implies that expectations
of the unemployment rate and vacancies reflect true values. This is likely to pose overly strong require-
ments on the cognitive abilities of economic agents and the implications of relaxing the assumption of
rational expectations should be investigated.
Here we analyse the equilibrium properties and dynamics of the Mortensen-Pissarides model whilst
representing agents as ‘good econometricians,’ who form forecasts according to their estimates of struc-
tural model parameters (Evans & Honkapohja, 2001). We follow the literature on econometric learning
and assume that agents employ a recursive least squares algorithm to update their parameter estimates
each period when new data becomes available. It can be argued that for agents in a labour market, a
priori knowledge at all times of the true law of motion of the economy, determined by general equilib-
rium effects, is unrealistic in the presence of structural shocks, and small departures from the rational
expectation assumption might alter qualitative or quantitative predictions. Econometric learning is able
to provide a behavioural foundation for the assumption of rational expectations if the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (REE) is shown to be learnable or E-stable (Evans & Honkapohja, 2001); i.e. small
deviations from this equilibrium are reversed over time, and the economy and agents’ parameter estim-
ates converge asymptotically to the true equilibrium values.
Restricting our attention here to a discrete time treatment of the textbook RBCMortensen-Pissarides
model (see Hagedorn & Manovskii, 2008), we derive the conditions under which its REE is E-stable.
We find that there are no parameter restrictions required beyond those made in the standard model to
guarantee this. Furthermore, we confirm that the model is in fact globally stable and satisfies the prop-
erties of Strong E-stability (i.e. is robust to over-parametrisation of the econometric relationship by the
agents). And so from this viewpoint, the assumption of rational expectations when studying or applying
this model is not unreasonable.
There exists a significant literature on the representation of the good econometrician in macroe-
conomic models. Mankiw et al. (2004) offer evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis.
Their analysis of surveys of professional forecasters and households containing expected inflation in
one year’s time shows significant autocorrelation in the forecast errors, which is compatible with eco-
nometric learning, but not with rational expectations. Milani (2007, 2011) also argues for the presence
of adaptive learning in DSGE models, using Bayesian methods to estimate a New Keynesian model that
nests learning with habit formation, indexation and other ‘mechanical’ ways of generating persistence.
His results show that learning is capable of replacing the other sources of persistence whilst at the same
time increasing the fit to the data as compared to rational expectations. Pfajfar & Santoro (2010) ex-
amine a survey of households’ inflation forecasts during 1978-2005 and conclude that the hypothesis of
the presence of rational expectations can be rejected, and that there is evidence in support of adaptive
learning dynamics. This view is further supported by Berardi & Galimberti (2012), who examine post-
WWII data of US inflation and output growth. Comparing the performance of different adaptive learning
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algorithms to match survey forecasts, their results suggest that economic agents form these according to
recursive least squares.
Our formulation of learning here is such that agents need only make one-step-ahead forecasts of the
labour market tightness using their estimated model parameters and observed productivity. This is not
the first paper to apply the principles of econometric learning to this class of model. From the same
model starting point, Di Pace et al. (2014) consider an alternate formulation in which agents must make
infinite horizon forecasts about the future path of wages, unemployment and profits. This type of learn-
ing fits into the anticipated utility approach (Kreps, 1998), and has notably been applied to the RBC
model by Eusepi & Preston (2011). Di Pace et al. (2014) focus on results with constant gain learning,
for which there are no equivalent analytical results to the E-stability conditions we consider. The au-
thors use the model to address the so-called ‘unemployment volatility puzzle’ (Shimer, 2005). Under
infinite horizon, they not only match US forecast errors for unemployment, but also generate significant
amplification relative to the baseline model. This is driven by persistence or inertia in agents’ expecta-
tions of the future path of wages, which thus implies firms are over-optimistic about future profits, post
more vacancies, and thus unemployment is more volatile relative to the REE baseline case. They also
find some, but significantly less, propagation of unemployment when they reformulate the model in a
one-step-ahead forecast guise.
We present illustrative simulations and analyse the dynamics of the unemployment model with eco-
nometric learning, and show that the REE could be a poor approximation to an economy in which agents
play the role of good econometricians in terms of levels. Convergence to the REE is slow when we give
agents only 50 quarters of historical data, even after we allow for weighted least squares learning. We
also show that structural shocks, when agents are learning but initially begin at the REE, generate a more
gradual ‘cyclical’ adjustment of wages, and thus unemployment volatility would be reduced relative to
under rational expectations. Therefore, we find conflicting results to Di Pace et al. (2014). Given that we
derive a minimum state variable form of the model, in which agents need only estimate the relationship
between labour market tightness and productivity to form their expectations and close the model, the
‘wage curve’ is already built-in. Thus, econometric learning generates inertia in expectations of the la-
bour market state and wages following shocks.1 And hence the same amplification mechanism described
in Di Pace et al. (2014) is not present. Given the only true choice variable in the model is the number of
vacancies that firms open or close each period, our application of learning appears to be a natural way
to extend the baseline model.
We consider in more detail the speed of convergence to the REE of the model. The same parameters
and magnitudes which reduce the speed of convergence substantially are the same as those which in the
REE model also effectively increase the model’s ability to match unemployment volatility: a relatively
high flow value of unemployment, low worker bargaining power and low matching function elasticity
1Although we do not expand on this point later, it is straightforward to see that the minimum state variable solution of the
model, which agents learn and use to form expectations, could be re-written in terms of wages and productivity by substituting
for the standard ‘wage curve’ which derives from the Nash Bargaining solution.
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w.r.t. unemployment (see Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) for a detailed discussion of these). Therefore,
in order to match the observed volatility of unemployment etc., more extreme values of these parameters
would be required when we relax rational expectations in this limited way.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we add learning to the textbook search and
match model of unemployment and derive key expectational stability results; in section 3 we discuss a
simple parametrisation of the model and results of stochastic recursive simulations with learning relative
to the REE; and in section 4 we summarise.
2 The Model
We briefly outline a standard textbook search and match model of the labour market (Pissarides, 2000)
and the resultant discrete time dynamic equation for the state of the labour market, measured by its
tightness, thus analogous to the treatment in Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008).
2.1 The labour market
There is a continuum of identical, risk neutral workers with total measure of one, and an infinite hori-
zon. The matching function M(ut ;vt) gives the number of successful matches in a given period. It is
increasing and concave in both of its arguments ut and vt , which represent the share of the total work-
force currently unemployed and the level of vacancies relative to the size of the workforce respectively.
Matches and separations occur after agents in the economy have made decisions, at the end of period t.
A Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale matching function is chosen due to its simplicity, well-known
features, and being commonplace in the literature;
M(ut ;vt) = muat v1 at m > 0 a 2 (0;1): (1)
For the following exposition we define the key parameter, the measure of labour market tightness, as
qt =
vt
ut
: (2)
The probability of a firm filling an open vacancy is
q(qt) =
M(ut ;vt)
vt
= mq at ; (3)
and the corresponding probability that an unemployed worker gets matched to an open vacancy is thus
qtq(qt) =
M(ut ;vt)
ut
= mq 1 at : (4)
The law of motion for the fraction of workers who are unemployed at the beginning of period t+ 1 is
given by
ut+1 = ut +(1 ut)l  qtq(qt)ut : (5)
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2.2 The household
For ex-positional simplicity we consider an economy comprising a single representative household of
size one, in which all workers are identical, risk neutral and there is perfect consumption insurance
across members. The household can therefore be represented by the Bellman equation
Wt(n;y) = wtnt +Dt +b(1 nt)+dW et+1(n;y); (6)
with the law of motion for employment given by
nt+1 = (1 l )nt +qtq(qt)(1 nt); (7)
where Wt(n;y) represents its current value function, labour productivity is denoted by yt , and e shows
time t subjective expectations. The household takes as given wages wt , dividends from the representative
firm Dt and labour market tightness qt . The period utility value from non-employment is given by b, and
d is the discount factor. Applying the envelope theorem, the surplus from an additional member of the
household being employed is given by
¶Wt(n;y)
¶nt
= wt  b+d (1 l  qtq(qt))
¶W et+1(n;y)
¶nt+1
; (8)
i.e. the net value of employment plus the expected continuation value.
2.3 The firm
A representative firm with linear production function maximises profits by choosing the quantity of
vacancies to post in each period, at constant ongoing cost c, subject to the law of motion for the labour
market, and taking wt and qt as given. This problem can be represented as the Bellman equation
Pt(v; ;n;y) =max
vt0
ytnt  wtnt   cvt +dPet+1(v; ;n;y); (9)
with the constraint
nt+1 = (1 l )nt +q(qt)vt ; (10)
Pt(v; ;n;y) represents its current value function. The first order condition is given by
¶Pet+1(v;n;y)
¶nt+1
=
c
dq(qt)
: (11)
Applying the envelope theorem, and using the first order condition gives the surplus to the firm from
employing an additional worker
¶Pt(v;n;y)
¶nt
= yt  wt + (1 l )cq(qt) ; (12)
i.e. the net profit from an additional employed worker plus the expected continuation value.
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2.4 Wage determination
Wages are determined by generalised Nash bargaining between firm and workers over the additional
surpluses (8) & (12), with worker bargaining power b 2 (0;1). Combining the surplus sharing rules
which form the solution of this problem, iterating forwards, and using (8) (12) & (11) gives what is
referred to in textbook model as the ‘wage curve’,
wt = (1 b )b+b (yt + cqt): (13)
2.5 REE and dynamics
The equilibrium of the model can be characterised and determined uniquely by the value of labour
market tightness at which point the representative firm is indifferent between opening an additional
vacancy or not, due to the assumption of free entry. The non-linear equation determining this value of
qt can be obtained by iterating forwards and taking expectations of the envelope theorem condition with
respect to employment for the firm, and then using the firm’s first order condition (11) and the wage
curve equation (13);
c
dq(qt)
= (1 b )(yet+1 b)+
(1 l )c
q(q et+1)
 q et+1bc: (14)
To provide intuition for this expression, we stress the similarities to (11). Aggregate labour market
tightness qt will adjust immediately to deviations from this equality via the representative firm instant-
aneously opening or closing vacancies. Thus, today’s labour market tightness is determined by expect-
ations of the value of a filled vacancy in the next period. However, this value is itself a function of the
labour market tightness (and other variables) in the next period due to the infinite nature of the Bellman
equations, and thus qt is a function of q et+1.
We assume that the process of worker productivity takes the form of a stationary AR(1) in logs
log(yt) = r log(yt 1)+ et ; r 2 [0;1) (15)
with et being an i.i.d. normal shock with variance s2e > 0.
Once agents have formed expectations for qt+1 and yt+1, the remaining endogenous variables of
interest such as wages and unemployment followmechanically using the model equations derived above.
To solve the system consisting of (14) and (15) we linearise around the steady state values q¯ and y¯ = 1
(see appendix for derivation);
qt = y0+y1yet+1+y2q et+1 (16)
yt = (1 r)+ryt 1+ et : (17)
In the following, the operator Etx denotes mathematical expectations formed at period t regarding vari-
able x. The linearised dynamics of output (17) can be substituted into (16) for yet+1 by noting that under
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rational expectations yet+1 = Etyt+1 = (1 r)+ryt and hence
qt = y˜0+ y˜1yt 1+ y˜2q et+1+ y˜1r 1et (18)
with
y˜0 = y0+y1(1 r)(1+r)
y˜1 = y1r2
y˜2 = y2:
A rational expectation equilibrium (REE) of the system (17) and (18) is a stochastic process qt that
satisfies this system with Etqt+1 = q et+1. As is well known, linear RE models in which agents form
expectations regarding an endogenous variable can possess multiple equilibria (or bubble solutions, i.e.
which are not related to economic fundamentals)2. If there are multiple stable rational expectations
equilibria then a model is said to be indeterminate. To see the possibility of this, note that (18) can be
written in ARMA(1,1) form as
qt = y˜ 12
 
r 1y˜1(1 r)  y˜0
  y˜1y˜ 12 r 1yt 1+ y˜ 12 qt 1+d1et +d2ht + y˜1r 1  y˜ 12  1et 1
(19)
with d1 and d2 arbitrary parameters and ht := Et+1[qt+2] Et [qt+2] being a martingale difference se-
quence such that Et [ht+1] = 0. No restrictions are imposed on d1 or d2 since rational expectations
formed according to (19) always result in an identity regardless of these parameters. Therefore, there
is a continuum of possible solutions to (19). Evans & Honkapohja (1986) have shown that any finite
degree ARMA solution of an equation of the form (18) can at most be ARMA(1,1) and the particular
form of (19) nests all possible ARMA solutions of finite degree. However, the ARMA class of solutions
is stable if jy˜2j > 1 and is unstable for jy˜2j < 1, in which case the unique stationary solution to (17)
and (18) is the fundamental or minimal state variable (MSV) solution. The MSV solution depends on
a minimal set of state variables such that it is impossible to delete any of the variables from the set and
still obtain solutions to (18) and (15) for all permitted parameter values (McCallum, 1983). The MSV
solution can be guessed to be of the form
qt = A+Byt 1+Cet (20)
since the only predetermined variable in the structural equation (18) is yt 1. In the Appendix it is shown
how (20) can be obtained from (19). We first focus on this solution, since inter alia McCallum (1983)
and Evans & Honkapohja (2001) argue that the MSV solution is the natural benchmark for learning and
the stability of equilibria. If agents are not able to learn the simplest representation (as few state variables
as possible), they cannot be expected to be able to learn equilibria containing more state variables and
to coordinate their behaviour towards them.
2The literature on bubbles and the related concept of indeterminacy is reviewed in Benhabib & Farmer (1999). The clas-
sic reference on bubble solutions is Blanchard & Watson (1983); see also Bullard & Mitra (2002) for a recent analysis of
indeterminacy in a New Keynesian framework.
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2.6 E-Stability of the MSV Solution
We now relax the assumption of rational expectations by modelling agents as econometricians attempt-
ing to estimate the parameters underpinning the true motion of the economy under uncertainty. There-
fore, agents are endowed with a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy of the MSV form, (20).
The task for agents is then to estimate the values of the parameters A, B and C. They form estimates
in period t given by Aˆt , Bˆt and Cˆt , and update these estimates every period when new data becomes
available. We assume agents perform this updating and estimation task by employing the recursive least
squares estimator. This is the most widely used estimation technique in the learning literature and Be-
rardi & Galimberti (2012) provide evidence that this estimator matches the observed survey forecasts of
US time series closely.3 According to the PLM, the forecast of next period’s labour market tightness is
q et+1 = Aˆt + Bˆt ((1 r)+ryt 1+ et) : (21)
There are potential problems arising due to possible simultaneity in forward looking models, (Evans
& Honkapohja, 2001). Therefore, it is assumed that although agents forecast qt+1 by using yt , the
variable yt is not in the information set for the estimation of Aˆt and Bˆt . However, as proved by Marcet &
Sargent (1989), this does not alter the asymptotic stability results obtained in the following as compared
to an algorithm allowing for simultaneity if agents are assumed to ignore outliers, defined as being an
observation outside a predetermined range. Inserting the econometric forecast into (18) gives the actual
law of motion (ALM) for labour market tightness
qt = y˜0+ y˜2Aˆt + y˜2(1 r)Bˆt +(y˜1+ y˜2rBˆt)yt 1+(y˜2Bˆt + y˜1r 1)et : (22)
This defines the following T -mapping from the PLM to the ALM
T
 
Aˆt ; Bˆt ;Cˆt

=
 
y˜0+ y˜2Aˆt + y˜2(1 r)Bˆt ; y˜1+ y˜2rBˆt ; y˜2Bˆt + y˜1r 1

: (23)
It is apparent that the T -mapping to Cˆt is determined by the other coefficients, and thus the estimate Cˆt is
independent ofC, and does not influence the stability results. Therefore, in what follows we refer to the
mappings T
 
Aˆt ; Bˆt

, and for Cˆt , V (Bˆt). There is a self-referential feature inherent in all learning models
which can be seen in equation (22). Although the parameters of their estimation (20) are non-stationary
during the transition to their steady state values, agents neglect this fact whilst forming their estimates
since a least squares method assumes the ‘true’ A, B and C to be constants. Intuitively, if the coeffi-
cient which determines the responsiveness to expectations is sufficiently small, this specification error
becomes asymptotically negligible and the economy converges to the REE (Evans &Honkapohja, 2001).
The estimation takes place via recursive least squares (RLS). Let z0t 1 = (1;yt 1) and x
0
t 1 = (Aˆt ; Bˆt)
so that
qt = z0t 1xt 1+ht : (24)
3The presented algorithm is comparable to a restricted form of the well-known Kalman filter. For further discussion of this
issue see Berardi & Galimberti (2013).
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The estimation error ht is perceived by the agents to be iid, however due to the self-referential nature of
the model there is an endogeneity bias which agents are unaware of and thus ht is not truly iid. We now
define St = åti=1 zi 1z0i 1 which allows us to write the RLS estimator as
St = St 1+ zt 1z0t 1 (25)
xt = xt 1+S 1t 1xt 1(qt   z0t 1xt 1): (26)
Furthermore, let Rt  t 1St :
Rt = Rt 1+ t 1(zt 1z0t 1 Rt 1) (27)
xt = xt 1+ t 1R 1t zt 1(qt   z0t 1xt 1); (28)
and thus
xt = xt 1+ t 1R 1t zt 1

z0t 1

T
 
Aˆt ; Bˆt
  xt 1+V (Bˆt)et	 ; (29)
with the gain sequence 1=t, often referred to as decreasing gain learning.4 This gain guarantees that
asymptotically new information is disregarded by agents.
For the rational expectations equilibrium to be asymptotically stable under learning, the E-stability
principle has to be fulfilled as shown by Evans & Honkapohja (2001). According to this principle,
the stability of the system in (27) and (29) with decreasing gain is governed by the following ordinary
differential equation (ODE), where t denotes ‘notional’ time
d
dt
 
Aˆ; Bˆ

= T
 
Aˆ; Bˆ
   Aˆ; Bˆ : (30)
The REE is then the unique fixed point of these differential equations. With this specification, it can be
shown that the REE of (18) is stable under the learning, i.e. small deviations from the steady state value
q¯ are reversed, if the sufficient condition
y˜2 < 1 (31)
holds. The necessary condition for E-stability is y˜2r < 1. In the Appendix we show that the sufficient
condition always holds for this model, and we have global convergence to the REE. As was explained
in the previous section, the model is determinate if jy˜2j< 1. We therefore can state the following:
Proposition 2.1. If the economy described by the system (17) and (18) exhibits determinacy and the
PLM is of the MSV form, and if agents learn using least squares updating, then so long as y˜2 < 1 the
unique REE is E-stable.
Corollary 2.2. The textbook equilibrium model of labour market search and match frictions, with ho-
mogeneous agents and no on the job search (Pissarides, 2000: Chapter 1), is E-stable.
4In the case of constant gain learning the weight given each observation is geometrically declining in the time since it was
observed, and the gain sequence would be 0< g < 1.
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2.7 Strong E-stability of the MSV Solution
Strong E-stability of a system is defined if the previous result is robust to over-parametrisation of the
PLM (Evans & Honkapohja, 2001). Assume that agents are forming their expectations of qt+1 according
to the general ARMA representation (19), and are not endowed with a PLM of the MSV form. Moreover,
due to econometric considerations they start with an arbitrarily over-parametrised version
qt = a+
s
å
j=1
b jyt  j+
r
å
j=1
c jqt  j+
q
å
j=1
d jet  j+
l
å
j=1
f jht  j+d0et + f0ht : (32)
Accordingly, expectations of qt+1 take the form
q et+1 = a+
s
å
j=1
b jyt+1  j+
r
å
j=1
c jqt+1  j+
q
å
j=1
d jet+1  j+
l
å
j=1
f jht+1  j; (33)
which can be substituted into equation (18) to obtain the new ALM and a corresponding T-mapping in
exactly the same way as before (see Appendix). Let b0 = (b1; :::;bs), c0 = (c1; :::;cr), d0 = (d0; :::;dq),
and also f0 = ( f0; :::; fl). Further, define f 0 = (a;b0;c0;d0; f0). According to the E-stability principle, the
ODE governing the stability of the above system is again given by
df
dt
= T (f) f : (34)
To investigate whether agents will detect the over-parametrisation and will converge towards the MSV
solution, the stability of the ODE at the REE represented by the MSV solution, given in (47), must be
compared. Notice that in this case a¯ = A, b¯1 = B and d¯0 =C is given, and all other coefficients of (32)
are equal to zero. In the appendix we show the following:
Proposition 2.3. If the economy described by the system (17) and (18) exhibits determinacy and the
PLM is of the over-parametrised ARMA form, and if agents learn using least squares updating, then so
long as y˜2 < 1 the unique REE is E-stable.
Corollary 2.4. The textbook equilibrium model of labour market search and match frictions, with ho-
mogeneous agents and no on the job search (Pissarides, 2000: Chapter 1), is Strongly E-stable.
3 Analysis
In the following section we present a brief analysis of the unemployment model with econometric learn-
ing described above. We consider two illustrative simulations to demonstrate the implied speed of con-
vergence and dynamics of the endogenous variables in the standard search model with learning. First,
we demonstrate e-stability when starting ‘realistically’ far away from the REE. Second, with agents
initially having assumed to have learned the RE equilibrium, we consider the impact of a shift implied
by an arbitrary change in some estimated parameter value. We then describe how learning affects the
dynamics of the model.
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3.1 Simulations
Since this is not a strict empirical exercise, we follow a relatively ad hoc and illustrative only paramet-
risation strategy using seasonally adjusted UK quarterly data for the period 1998-2013.5
We normalise average productivity to be 1. For the productivity process We estimate an AR(1) in
log deviations from trend6 of output per worker, and find an auto-regressive parameter r for the period
of 0.84 and standard deviation of the shocks se to be 0.0063 (assuming them to be normally distrib-
uted). We estimate the aggregate matching function below using OLS as per S¸ahin et al. (2012) for
2002q1-2013q2.7 As is common in the literature, we approximate a two state labour market simply by
ignoring those who are inactive. We proxy the number of matches, or new hires, as the total inflow into
employment mt in any quarter, and use the total number of vacancies in the economy.
log

mt
ut

= log(m)+(1 a) log

vt
ut

+zt : (35)
We find estimates of a = 0:39 and m = 1:08. For the exogenous separation we use the UK Labour
Force Survey two quarter hazard rate estimate for leaving employment, which for 2002q1-2013q2 gives
a quarterly average rate of l = 0:035. Brief summary statistics of the key model quarterly stock and
rate variables for the UK consistent with the parametrisation method here, are described in table 1.8 The
discount factor is set as d = 0:99 and to restrict the number of free parameters, we let the bargaining
power match the Hosios condition, b = a = 0:39. We also set the flow value of unemployment to 0.8.9
The remaining parameter, the flow vacancy cost c is set to match the observed level of average labour
market tightness. The full list of parameters and implied values of the endogenous variables for the
deterministic equilibrium are given below in table 2.
5All data used from ONS, downloaded 01/08/2014. Labour market data for those aged 16-64 only. For a more complete
calibration of the unemployment model using UK data see Burgess & Turon (2010)
6dynamically detrended using Hodrick & Prescott (1997) filter with standard quarterly smoothing parameter
7Also following Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013) we consider time trends in the estimation to account for the enodogeneity
of unobserved shifts in the matching efficiency with the number of vacancies firms open, but these all drop out. We also carry
out tests that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, and reject the alternative. In line with the existing literature, we find
that the data suggests the matching function has decreasing returns to scale, although we proceed as though it is constant; see
Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) for a thorough review of estimates of the aggregate matching function.
8All regressed on cubic trend to account for low frequency shifts for the short period in question
9How to select or estimate appropriate values of both the bargaining power and the flow value of unemployment are open
to significant academic debate. Shimer (2005) and subsequently Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) are often considered in the
literature as the extreme examples for parametrisations, and highlight how this greatly affects the ability of the model to match
the observed volatility of unemployment and vacancy creation. With the arbitrary parametrisation here we are somewhere in
between these two extreme values.
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Table 1: Level & quarterly rate summary statistics:
Consistent with model parametrisation, 2002q1-2013q2
Mean Std err.
Tightness - qt = vtut 0.35 0.039
Job finding rate - qtq(qt) = mtut 0.59 0.045
Job separation rate - lt 0.035 0.0021
‘Equilibrium unemployment’ - ut =
lt
lt+mtut
0.058 0.0088
Actual unemployment rate, 16-64 0.058 0.0039
Source: authors’ calculations using UK Labour Force Survey and Labour Market Statistics
Table 2: Assumed/estimated parameter values and deterministic equilibrium
Deterministic parameter Assumed value
y 1
b 0.8
c 0.74
l 0.035
m 1.08
a 0.39
b 0.39
d 0.99
r 0.84
s 0.006
Endogenous variable Deterministic equilibrium
q 0.35
u 0.058
v 0.02
w 0.98
Source: authors’ calculations
12
For completeness we write-out in full the stochastic recursive sequence that represents the model,
stating from period t0:
(I) ut+2 = l (1 ut+1)+
h
1 m  z0tT (xt)+V (xt)et+11 aiut+1
(II) Rt+1 = Rt +
1
t+1
(ztz0t  Rt)
(III) xt+1 = xt +
1
t+1
R 1t+1zt

z0t [T (xt)  xt ]+V (xt)et+1
	
(IV ) yt+1 = (1 r)+ryt + et+1
(V ) et+2  i:i:d: N(0;s2):
When written out in sequence order, the simultaneity which requires us to exclude yt from the in-
formation set used to estimate xt becomes clear. The adaptive learning process, which takes place at the
beginning of each period, can also be represented by figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of the labour market & agents’ learning
To initiate the sequence from t0 we must choose initial values u1, x0, z0 S0 and e1. The asymptotic
properties of decreasing or constant gains least squares recursion will hold irrespective of the initial con-
ditions. As suggested by Carceles-Poveda & Giannitsarou (2007) the approach taken to set initial values
z0 and S0 should depend on the particular model in question and the empirical purpose of the researchers.
One approach we might take is to use historic or randomly generated data, with t0 set sufficiently large
such that S0 is invertible; in this case t0  2. This approach is most useful when attempting to compare
the performance of models with learning and the assumption of agents as being ‘good econometricians’
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against real data. However, this gives few clues as to how large t0 should be, and the subsequent simula-
tion is likely to be sensitive to this assumed level of memory of agents, particularly for decreasing gain
least squares. Another attractive option is to choose initial values from an assumed distribution around
the REE.
To set the initial conditions here we use the same data used to parametrise the model to estimate
(36); where cubtrt represents a cubic time trend to account for the possibility that agents recognise low
frequency structural breaks in the relationship; productivity is normalised but not de-trended; and we
include significant MA terms to account for otherwise unaccounted for auto-correlation when the MSV
is applied to real world data, which the good econometrician may in practice account for by what we have
referred to before as an over-parametrised PLM.10 t0 = 50 is the maximum number of UK observations
available to us.
qt = A+ cubtrt +Byt 1+k1zt 1+k2zt 2+zt ; t = 2001q2:::2013q3: (36)
Using this approach, we set S0 =
 
50 50
50 50:075

, x00 = ( 1:22;1:77), z00 = (1;1), e1 = 0 and
u1 =
l
l +m
 
z00T (x0)
1 a (= 0:052): (37)
To analyse the impact of adding adaptive learning to the basic search frictions model of the labour market
we should focus on the simulated time paths of wages and the tightness parameter, which are independ-
ent of u1. With the parametrisation as described above the REE parameters of the MSV solution are
given by x0REE = ( 0:9;1:25). That is to say the elasticity of q to productivity at the long-run average
level is around 3, which is significantly lower than observed in the data.
Figure 2 (see appendix) demonstrates a simulation for the baseline case of agents with rational ex-
pectations.11 Unsurprisingly, as is common with this class of models, as described in table 3, the REE
does not come close to matching the key moments for labour market tightness and unemployment. Fig-
ure 3 shows results from a simulation with decreasing gain learning taking initial values as described
above. The key result is that when giving agents a relatively small amount of historical data (12.5 years),
and initial estimates of the model parameters which are not unrealistically far from the true REE val-
ues, decreasing gain learning convergence is shown to be very slow. As shown by figure 4 this takes
roughly 500 years despite being exponential. This indicates that under adaptive learning, an economy
could be persistently away from its REE level of unemployment, either on the high or low side, even
though agents are behaving rationally in the limited sense prescribed by the ‘good econometrician.’ In
this sense, rational expectations is a poor approximation to a model with learning in terms of levels. One
recommendation from this result is that when calibrating the Mortensen-Pissarides, targeting second
10In determining initial conditions, one could also consider the class of GARCH, error correction, or even VAR models,
however we believe this would be an unnecessarily significant leap from the straightforward least squares updating we assume
that a ‘good econometrician’ carries outs in practice, and which constitutes the learning algorithm we study here.
11Random number seed set to 42 in Python Numpy application for all simulations.
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moments of the data should always be preferable, whereas not hitting levels of the endogenous variables
should not be too concerning.
Table 3: Simulation results
St.dev St.dev Min Max
t  t0+20 t  t0+100
Rational expectations eq.
w 0.01 0.008 0.96 0.99
u 0.0014 0.0012 0.056 0.061
q 0.018 0.014 0.032 0.038
Learning (I) - least squares
w 0.011 0.009 0.98 1.02
u 0.0014 0.0014 0.05 0.056
q 0.023 0.019 0.37 0.45
Learning (IV) - constant gain g = 0:05
w 0.013 0.010 0.97 1.01
u 0.0018 0.0022 0.051 0.059
q 0.027 0.026 0.33 0.44
Source: authors’ calculations
As a further example in figure 5 we simulate the model with no memory, and allow the agents’ to
have guessed the correct initial parameter estimates x00 = x
0
REE , but suppose that there is an immediate
negative 10% shock to the flow value of unemployment. Under rational expectations, due to the rise in
the surplus of a match, firms immediately open more vacancies, and the unemployment rate falls. Under
learning, the initial increase in q is smaller. Therefore, unemployment falls more slowly as agents
effectively attempt to disentangle the effects of the structural shock from the stochastic process. In this
sense, the response to the shock leads to a less volatile response for unemployment. Thus, if actual
labour market series feature the effects of frequent permanent shocks of this kind, econometric learning
will not improve the ability of the model to match their cyclicality.
3.2 Speed of convergence
As shown theoretically in (Benveniste et al., 2012), the learning of the agents results in root-t conver-
gence to the true REE parameter estimates if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the system have real
part < 1=2.12 As shown, in the appendix when we derive the E-stability conditions, this requires that
y˜ < 1=2. In the example parametrisation above (figure 3) this is ensured, with y˜ = 0:39. In fact, more
generally, it can also be shown with simulations that the speed of convergence decreases substantially as
the value of y˜ moves closer to 1, the threshold for E-Stability. To illustrate this, in figure 6 we consider
a doubling of y˜ by decreasing worker bargaining power to b = 0:1, keeping all other parameters except
c constant, which we again use to match our target value of q . As expected, the rate of convergence is
12I.e. the rate at which in classical econometrics the mean of the least squares parameter estimate converges to the true
value.
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slowed substantially, and the economy remains more persistently away from the REE. A higher speed
of convergence is one way in which the REE model could become an improved approximation of an
alternative with econometric learning.
3.3 Constant gain learning
In figure 7, for completeness we also compare the results of our first simulation with decreasing gain
learning to an equivalent example with a gain parameter gt = 0:05.13 As expected, when agents weight
recent data more highly, i.e. with weighted least squares learning, convergence to the REE is faster,
and agents’ parameter estimates are more volatile. This faster convergence also results in more volatile
series of labour market tightness, wages and unemployment. However, the gain parameter we use here
to guarantee faster convergence implies agents roughly only use data over the past 20 quarters to update
their beliefs, and is notably outside the range suggested by the adaptive learning literature (see for
example Di Pace et al. (2014) for a discussion). Therefore, the simulation results with constant gain
learning, with more reasonable levels of memory weighting, are not dissimilar to those with decreasing
gain.
4 Summary and discussion
We take the textbook RBC version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model of search and match frictions for
the labour market and show that the unique REE is not only always E-stable, but this result is robust to
over-parametrisation of the PLM used by agents (Strong E-stability) with decreasing gain learning. This
PLM is assumed to be in the minimum state variable form, and as such agents only use productivity and
estimated model parameters to form expectations of future labour market conditions. These local con-
vergence conditions also extend trivially to global convergence. Hence, from the perspective by which
we think agents may in practice apply something that looks like econometric learning, the rational ex-
pectations assumption in this class of model is not unreasonable. We use recent UK data to parametrise
the model, and show that although the model is E-stable, implied convergence can be very slow. There-
fore, the rational expectations model of unemployment could be a poor approximation to one in which
agents learn econometrically, particularly in the presence of frequent structural or permanent shocks.
The so-called ‘Shimer puzzle’ addresses the extent to which the RBC version of the Mortensen-
Pissarides can match key moments of economic time series, in particular the volatility of unemployment,
and lack thereof for wages. Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) discuss at length how the model can be
calibrated to match these moments. They focus on the role of a high flow utility from non-employment
(b), and low worker bargaining power (b ) and matching elasticity (a) to match these volatilities. In our
linearised system, the sensitivity of q to productivity shocks is determined by the true REE parameter
B, which becomes large as y˜ goes to 1. It is straightforward to show that the same combination of high
13For constant gain learning there is no analytic solution for expectational stability and so we must select a reasonably small
gain parameters to ensure convergence.
16
b, low b & a not only implies higher volatility of q and unemployment, but also slower convergence
to the REE in the model with learning.14 Thus, in a world with least squares learning, more ‘extreme’
values of these parameters would be implied to match the observed cyclicality of unemployment, wages
etc.. And so the result of relaxing rational expectations in this limited way is to move us further from
addressing the unemployment volatility puzzle.
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A Appendix
A.1 Linearisation
We take a first order Taylor approximation around the deterministic steady state values of q and yt , q¯
and y¯ = 1 respectively, approximating the right and the left hand side of equation (14) which is stated
here again for convenience
c
dq(qt)
= (1 b )(yet+1 b)+
(1 l )c
q(q et+1)
 q et+1bc: (38)
This results in
c
dq(q¯)
  cq
0(q¯)
d [q(q¯)]2
(qt   q¯) =(1 b )(y¯ b)+(1 b )(yet+1  y¯)
  q¯bc bc(q et+1  q¯)+
(1 l )c
q(q¯)
  (1 l )cq
0(q¯)
[q(q¯)]2
(q et+1  q¯):
(39)
By noting that
c
dq(q¯)
= (1 b )(y¯ b)+ (1 l )c
q(q¯)
  q¯bc (40)
must hold in equilibrium according to (14), this steady state condition can be subtracted from both
sides of the approximated equation. Then solving explicitly for qt and defining the functional form
q(q) = mq a , (39) becomes
qt =

1+
bdm2(q¯) 2a
am(q¯) a 1
  (1 l )d

q¯
  (1 b )dm
2(q¯) 2a
cam(q¯) a 1
y¯
+
(1 b )dm2(q¯) 2a
cam(q¯) a 1
yet+1
+

 bdm
2(q¯) 2a
am(q¯) a 1
+(1 l )d

q et+1:
(41)
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which can be simplified to
qt =

1+
bdm(q¯)1 a
a
  (1 l )d

q¯
  (1 b )dm(q¯)
1 a
ca
y¯
+
(1 b )dm(q¯)1 a
ca
yet+1
+

 bdm(q¯)
1 a
a
+(1 l )d

q et+1:
(42)
The form given in the text, (16), qt = y0+y1yet+1+y2q et+1 thus has coefficients
y0 =

1+
bdm(q¯)1 a
a
  (1 l )d

q¯   (1 b )dm(q¯)
1 a
ca
y¯; (43)
y1 =
(1 b )dm(q¯)1 a
ca
; (44)
y2 =

 bdm(q¯)
1 a
a
+(1 l )d

; (45)
with the steady state value for labour market tightness the solution to
(1 b )(y¯ b)  (
1 d
d +l )cq¯
a
m
 bcq¯ = 0: (46)
A.2 REE Values
The REE values of the parameters A, B, andC are found using the method of undetermined coefficients
A=
y˜0
1  y˜2 +
y˜1y˜2(1 r)
(1  y˜2)(1  y˜2r) ; (47)
B=
y˜1
1  y˜2r ; (48)
C = Br 1; (49)
where we have assumed that y˜2 6= 1 and y˜2r 6= 1.
A.3 E-Stability
According to Evans & Honkapohja (2001) an REE is E-stable if the associated ordinary differential
equation given in (30) is asymptotically locally stable under learning. This is the case, if all the eigen-
values of the Jacobian of
T (Aˆ; Bˆ)  (Aˆ; Bˆ) (50)
have negative real parts, see Evans & Honkapohja (2001). Thus, we must have
y˜2r 1< 0 (51)
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and
y˜2 1< 0; (52)
whereby the second condition implies the validity of the first. Therefore, we need to check that the
second condition is true. Writing out the term y˜2 and rearranging, we see that
d ((1 l ) bm(q¯)1 aa 1)< 1 (53)
is always true for the widest range of sensible assumed parameter values (0  d < 1; l > 0; 0 <
b < 1; m > 0; a > 0; and which all imply q¯ > 0) and hence the REE is E-stable.
A.4 Global convergence
Given the model discussed here has a unique equilibrium, and satisfies the assumptions of Evans &
Honkapohja (1998) that guarantee global convergence, we simply apply their Theorem 2 to the recursive
learning algorithm given by (27) and (29).
For Rt , using Eztz
0
t =Mz, whereMz is some positive definite matrix, taking expectations we have the
ODE
dR
dt
=Mz S; (54)
which is clearly globally asymptotically stable and independent of xt .
It is possible that for some t Rt may not be invertible, though this will happen only a finite number
of times with probability 1. We modify the algorithm for xt to
xt = xt 1+ t 1u(Rt 1)zt 1

z0t 1

T
 
Aˆt ; Bˆt
  xt 1+ht	 ; (55)
where u(R) is a bounded regular function from the space of 2x2 matrices to the subspace of positive
definite matrices such that u(R) = R 1 in the neighbourhood of Mz. Then taking expectations the ODE
is given by
dx
dt
= u(s)Mz(T (Aˆ; Bˆ)  (A;B))0 (56)
= u(s)Mz(y˜2 1)((Aˆ; Bˆ)  (A;B))0 : (57)
Given that the other requirements of the theorem are trivially satisfied, then it applies, and this differential
equation is clearly globally asymptotically stable for y˜2 < 1, and this stability is exponential; (Aˆ; Bˆ)!
(A;B) globally almost surely.
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A.5 ALM and T-mapping ARMA solution and E-stability
qt =
y˜0+ y˜2(a+b1(1 r))
1  y˜2c1 +
y˜1+ y˜2(b2+b1r)
1  y˜2c1 yt 1+
y˜2(b1+d1)+ y˜1r 1
1  y˜2c1 et +
y˜2 f1
1  y˜2c1ht
+
y˜2
1  y˜2c1
s
å
j=3
b jyt+1  j+
y˜2
1  y˜2c1
r
å
j=2
c jqt+1  j
+
y˜2
1  y˜2c1
q
å
j=2
d jet+1  j+
y˜2
1  y˜2c1
l
å
j=2
f jht+1  j: (58)
This defines again a T-mapping from the PLM to the ALM with corresponding elements
a=
y˜0+ y˜2(a+b1(1 r))
1  y˜2c1 ; (59)
b1 =
y˜1+ y˜2(b1r+b2)
1  y˜2c1 ; (60)
d0 =
y˜1r 1+ y˜2(b1+d1)
1  y˜2c1 ; (61)
b j =
y˜2
1  y˜2c1 b j+1; j = 2; :::;s 1; bs = 0; (62)
c j =
y˜2
1  y˜2c1 c j+1; j = 1; :::;r 1; cr = 0; (63)
d j =
y˜2
1  y˜2c1 d j+1; j = 1; :::;q 1; dq = 0; (64)
f j =
y˜2
1  y˜2c1 f j+1; j = 0; :::; l 1; fl = 0: (65)
Since (59) - (65) describes a non-linear system of differential equations, we first have to linearise (34) to
study stability properties. However, the subsystem (63) is independent of the other equations and can be
analysed separately. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian of T (c) c at the REE values c j = 0 for j= 1t; :::;r
are found to be r times repeatedly equal to  1 and therefore the subsystem (63) will converge towards
the REE values. Due to the convergence of c it is apparent that d (apart from d0) and f will also converge
to their REE values being vectors of zeros. Moreover, b j = 0 for j = 2; :::;s is easily verified to be the
values towards which the economy under learning converges. Finally, convergence of a, b1 and d0 are
studied by analysing the Jacobian of the system (59)-(61). If this Jacobian has eigenvalues strictly less
than unity, then the whole system is E-stable. It can easily be verified that the eigenvalues are y˜2 and
y˜2r .
A.6 ARMA(1,1) and the MSV solution
Derivation of MSV solution: (19) can be re-written as
qt =
ry˜0  y˜1(1 r)
r(1  y˜2) +
y˜1
r(L  y˜2)yt 1 
d1y˜2
(L  y˜2)et  
d2
(L  y˜2)ht ; (66)
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with L denoting the lag operator such that Lxt = xt 1. The parameter d1 and d2 can be chosen arbitrarily.
In particular, to obtain the MSV solution
qt = A+Byt 1+Cet (67)
one must first set d2 = 0. (66) can be re-written as:
qt =
ry˜0  y˜1(1 r)
r(1  y˜2)   (r
 1y˜1yt 1 d1y˜2et)
¥
å
i=1
y˜ i2 L
i 1: (68)
qt =
ry˜0  y˜1(1 r)
r(1  y˜2) +r
 1y˜1y˜ 12 (1 r)
¥
å
i=1
(
i
å
j=1
r  j)y˜ i2  r 1y˜1y˜ 12 yt 1
¥
å
i=0
(ry˜) i
+ et 1(r 1y˜1y˜ 12
¥
å
i=1
(
i
å
j=1
r  jLi  j)y˜ i2 +d1
¥
å
i=1
y˜ i2 L
i 1)+d1et :
(69)
Therefore, to derive an MSV solution from a broader the class of ARMA(1,1) solutions, in which no
lags of et can remain, we therefore see from (69) that
d1 =  y˜1ry˜2

1
ry˜2
+(
1
ry˜2
)2+(
1
ry˜2
)3+ :::

(70)
=
y˜1
ry˜2(1 ry˜2) i f y˜2 >
1
r
> 1; (71)
which corresponds to the condition for stable ARMA(1,1) solutions. Otherwise, the MSV solution can-
not be derived from the class of unstable ARMA(1,1) solutions, and is instead the only stable solution.
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A.7 Simulation Figures
Figure 2: Baseline – Rational expectations eq.
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Figure 3: Learning (I) - Comparison of recursive least squares learning with rational expectations eq.
With initial parameter estimates assumed to be ‘realistically’ far away from true REE values
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Figure 4: Learning (I) - Convergence of parameter estimates
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Figure 5: Learning (II) - Comparison of recursive least squares learning with rational expectations eq.
Following a -10% shock to the flow value of unemployment, with initial parameter estimates assumed
to be at the true REE values
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Figure 6: Learning (III) - Speed of convergence comparison, changing worker bargaining power b
Given b = 0:1, then y˜ = 0:81. For b = a , y˜ = 0:39.
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Figure 7: Learning (IV) - Comparison of decreasing and constant gain learning
With initial parameter estimates assumed to be ‘realistically’ far away from true REE values
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